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Abstract
We introduce a simple model of economy, where the time evolution is described by an
equation capturing both exchange between individuals and random speculative trading,
in such a way that the fundamental symmetry of the economy under an arbitrary change
of monetary units is insured. We investigate a mean-field limit of this equation and
show that the distribution of wealth is of the Pareto (power-law) type. The Pareto
behaviour of the tails of this distribution appears to be robust for finite range models,
as shown using both a mapping to the random ‘directed polymer’ problem, as well as
numerical simulations. In this context, a transition between an economy dominated
by a few individuals from a situation where the wealth is more evenly spread out,
is found. An interesting outcome is that the distribution of wealth tends to be very
broadly distributed when exchanges are limited, either in amplitude or topologically.
Favoring exchanges (and, less surprisingly, increasing taxes) seems to be an efficient
way to reduce inequalities.
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It is a well known fact that the individual wealth is a very broadly distributed quantity
among the population. Even in developed countries, it is common that 90% of the total
wealth is owned by only 5% of the population. The distribution of wealth is often described
by ‘Pareto’-tails, which decay as a power-law for large wealths [1, 2, 3]:
P>(W ) ∼
(
W0
W
)µ
, (1)
where P>(W ) is the probability to find an agent with wealth greater than W , and µ is a
certain exponent, of order 1 both for individual wealth or company sizes (see however [4]).
Here, we want to discuss the appearance of such Pareto tails on the basis of a very general
model for the growth and redistribution of wealth, that we discuss in some simple limits. We
relate this model to the so-called ‘directed polymer’ problem in the physics literature [5], for
which a large number of results are known, that we translate into the present economical
framework. We discuss the influence of simple parameters, such as the connectivity of the
exchange network, the role of income or capital taxes and of state redistribution of wealth,
on the value of the exponent µ. One of the most interesting output of such a model is the
generic existence of a phase transition, separating a phase where the total wealth of a very
large population is concentrated in the hands of a finite number of individuals (corresponding,
as will be discussed below, to the case µ < 1), from a phase where it is shared by a finite
fraction of the population.
The basic idea of our model is to write a stochastic dynamical equation for the wealth
Wi(t) of the i
th agent at time t, that takes into account the exchange of wealth between
individuals through trading, and is consistent with the basic symmetry of the problem under
a change of monetary units. Since the unit of money is arbitrary, one indeed expects that the
equation governing the evolution of wealth should be invariant when all Wi’s are multiplied
by a common (arbitrary) factor. The evolution equation that we consider is therefore the
following:
dWi
dt
= ηi(t)Wi +
∑
j(6=i)
JijWj −
∑
j(6=i)
JjiWi , (2)
where ηi(t) is a gaussian random variable of mean m and variance 2σ
2, which describes the
spontaneous growth or decrease of wealth due to investment in stock markets, housing, etc.,
while the terms involving the (assymmetric) matrix Jij describe the amount of wealth that
agent j spends buying the production of agent i (and vice-versa). It is indeed reasonable to
think that the amount of money earned or spent by each economical agent is proportional
to its wealth. This makes equation (2) invariant under the scale transformation Wi → λWi.
Technically the above stochastic differential equation is interpreted in the Stratonovich sense
[6].
The simplest model one can think of is the case where all agents exchange with all others
at the same rate, i.e Jij ≡ J/N for all i 6= j. Here, N is the total number of agents, and the
scaling J/N is needed to make the limit N →∞ well defined. In this case, the equation for
Wi(t) becomes:
dWi
dt
= ηi(t)Wi + J(W −Wi), (3)
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where W = N−1
∑
iWi is the average overall wealth. This is a ‘mean-field’ model since all
agents feel the very same influence of their environment. By formally integrating this linear
equation and summing over i, one finds that the average wealth becomes deterministic in the
limit N →∞:
W (t) = W (0) exp((m+ σ2)t). (4)
It is useful to rewrite eq. (3) in terms of the normalised wealths wi ≡Wi/W . This leads to:
dwi
dt
= (ηi(t)−m− σ2)wi + J(1− wi), (5)
to which one can associate the following Fokker-Planck equation for the evolution of the
density of wealth P (w, t):
∂P
∂t
=
∂[J(w − 1) + σ2w]P
∂w
+ σ2
∂
∂w
[
w
∂wP
∂w
]
. (6)
The equilibrium, long time solution of this equation is easily shown to be:
Peq(w) = Z
exp−µ−1
w
w1+µ
µ ≡ 1 + J
σ2
, (7)
where Z = (µ − 1)µ/Γ[µ] is the normalisation factor. One can check that 〈w〉 ≡ 1, as it
should.
Therefore, one finds in this model that the distribution of wealth exhibits a Pareto power-
law tail for large w’s. In agreement with intuition, the exponent µ grows (corresponding to a
narrower distribution), when exchange between agents is more active (i.e. when J increases),
and also when the success in individual investment strategies is more narrowly distributed
(i.e. when σ2 decreases).
One can actually also define the above model in discrete time, by writing:
Wi(t+ τ) =
[
JτW + (1− Jτ)Wi
]
e−V (i,t) (8)
where V is an arbitrary random variable of mean mτ and variance 2σ2τ , and Jτ < 1. In
this setting, this amounts to study the so-called Kesten variable [7] for which the asymptotic
distribution again has a power-law tail, with an exponent µ found to be the solution of:
(1− Jτ)µ〈e−µV 〉 = 〈e−V 〉µ. (9)
Therefore, this model leads to power-law tails for a very large class of distributions of V , such
that the solution of the above equation is non trivial (that is if the distribution of V decays
at least as fast as an exponential). Is is easy to check that µ is always greater than one and
tends to µ = 1 + J/σ2 in the limit τ → 0. Let us notice that a somewhat similar discrete
model was studied in [8] in the context of a generalized Lotka-Volterra equation. However
that model has an additional term (the origin of which is unclear in an economic context)
which breaks the symmetry under wealth rescaling, and as a consequence the Pareto tail is
truncated for large wealths.
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Figure 1: Fraction of total wealth Sn owned by the first n agents, plotted versus n, in a
population of 5000 agents. The wealths have been drawn at random using a distribution
with a Pareto tail exponent µ = 3. Inset: detail of the first 80 agents. One sees that Sn
grows linearly with n, with rather small fluctuations around the average slope 1/N .
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Figure 2: Fraction of total wealth owned by the first n agents, plotted versus n, in a population
of 5000 agents. The wealths have been drawn at random using a distribution with a now
Pareto tail exponent µ = .5 < 1. Inset: Zoom on finer details of the curve. One clearly sees
that the curve is a ‘devil’ staircase on all scales, with a strong dominance of a few individuals.
In this model, the exponent µ is always found to be larger than one. In such a regime, if
one plots the partial wealth Sn =
∑n
i=1wi as a function of n, one finds an approximate straight
line of slope 1/N , with rather small fluctuations (see Fig. 1). This means that the wealth
is not too unevenly distributed within the population. On the other hand, the situation
when µ < 1, which we shall encounter below in some more realistic models, corresponds to a
radically different situation (see Fig. 2). In this case, the partial wealth Sn has, for large N ,
a devil staircase structure, with a few individuals getting hold of a finite fraction of the total
wealth. A quantitative way to measure this ‘wealth condensation’ is to consider the so-called
inverse participation ratio Y2 defined as:
Y2 =
N∑
i=1
w2i . (10)
If all the wi’s are of order 1/N then Y2 ∼ 1/N and tends to zero for large N . On the other
hand, if at least one wi remains finite when N →∞, then Y2 will also be finite. The average
value of Y2 can easily be computed and is given by: 〈Y2〉 = 1 − µ for µ < 1 and zero for all
µ > 1 [9, 10, 11]. 〈Y2〉 is therefore a convenient order parameter which quantifies the degree
of wealth condensation.
It is interesting to discuss several extensions of the above model. First, one can easily
include, within this framework, the effect of taxes. Income tax means that a certain fraction
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φI of the income dWi/dt is taken away from agent i. Therefore, there is a term −φIdWi/dt
appearing in the right-hand side of Eq. (2). Capital tax means that there is a fraction φC of
the wealth which is substracted per unit time from the wealth balance, Eq. (2). If a fraction
fI of the income tax and fC of the capital tax are evenly redistributed to all, then this
translates into a term +fIφIdW/dt + fCφCW in the right-hand side of the wealth balance,
which now reads:
dWi
dt
= ηi(t)Wi + J(W −Wi)− φI dWi
dt
− φCWi + fIφI dW
dt
+ fCφCW (11)
All these terms can be treated exactly within the above mean-field model allowing for a
detailed discussion of their respective roles. The rate of exponential growth of the average
wealth W (t) becomes equal to:
γ ≡ m+ σ
2/(1 + φI)− φC(1− fC)
1 + φI(1− fI) . (12)
The Pareto tail exponent µ is now given by:
µ− 1 = J(1 + φI)
σ2
+
1 + φI
σ2(1 + φI(1− fI))
[
φIfI(m+
σ2
1 + φI
) + φC(fC + φI(fC − fI))
]
. (13)
This equation is quite interesting. It shows that income taxes tend to reduce the inequalities
of wealth (i.e., lead to an increase of µ), even more so if part of this tax is redistributed.
On the other hand, quite surprisingly, capital tax, if used simultaneously to income tax and
not redistributed, leads to a decrease of µ, i.e. to a wider distribution of wealth. Only if a
fraction fC > fIφI/(1 + φI) is redistributed will the capital tax be a truly social tax. Note
that in the above equation, we have implicitly assumed that the growth rate γ is positive.
In this case, one can check that µ is always greater than 1 + (J + φCfC)(1 + φI)/σ
2, which
is larger than one.
Another point worth discussing is the relaxation time associated to the Fokker-Planck
equation (6). By changing variables as w = ξ−2 and P (w) = ξ3Q(ξ), one can map the above
Fokker-Plank equation to the one studied in [12], which one can solve exactly. For large time
differences T , one finds that the correlation function of the w’s behaves as:
〈w(t+ T )w(t)〉 − 〈w(t)〉2 ∝ exp(−(µ− 1)σ2T ) µ > 2 (14)
and
〈w(t+ T )w(t)〉 − 〈w(t)〉2 ∝ 1
(σ2T )3/2
exp(−µ2σ2T/4) µ < 2 (15)
This shows that the relaxation time is, for µ < 2, given by 4/µ2σ2. Therefore, rich people
become poor (and vice versa) on a finite time scale in this model. A reasonable order of
magnitude for σ is 10% per
√
year. In order to get µ − 1 ∼ 1, one therefore has to choose
J ∼ 0.01 per year, i.e. 1% of the total wealth of an individual is used in exchanges. [This J
value looks rather small, but in fact we shall see below that a more realistic (non-mean field
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Figure 3: Plot of the numerical values of µ for the model on a random graph with connectivity
c = 4, as a function of J/σ2 – we have indeed checked that this scaling holds for our numerical
discretization of Eq. (2). The plain line corresponds to the mean-field prediction µ = 1+J/σ2.
For c = 4, we find that the condensation transition takes place for J/σ2 ∼ 0.3.
model) allows to increase J while keeeping µ fixed]. In this case, the relaxation time in this
model is of the order of 100 years.
Let us now escape from the mean-field model considered above and describe more realistic
situations, where the number of economic neighbours to a given individual is finite. We will
first assume that the matrix Jij is still symmetrical, and is either equal to J (if i and j trade),
or equal to 0. A reasonable first assumption is that the graph describing the connectivity of
the population is completely random, i.e. that two points are neighbours with probability
c/N and disconnected with probability 1 − c/N . In such a graph, the average number of
neighbours is equal to c. We thus scale Jˆ = J/c in order to compare results with various
connectivities (and insure a smooth large connectivity limit). We have performed some
numerical simulations of Eq. (2) for c = 4 and have found that the wealth distribution still
has a power-law tail, with an exponent µ which only depends on the ratio J/σ2. This is
expected since a rescaling of time by a factor α can be absorbed by changing J into αJ and
σ into
√
ασ; therefore, long time (equilibrium) properties can only depend on the ratio J/σ2.
As shown in Fig. 3, the exponent µ can now be smaller than one for sufficiently small values
of J/σ2. In this model, one therefore expects wealth condensation when the exchange rate is
too small. Note that we have also computed numerically the quantity 〈Y2〉 and found very
good agreement with the theoretical value 1− µ determined from the slope of the histogram
of the wi’s.
From the physical point of view, the class of models which we consider here belong to
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the general family of directed polymers in random media. The two cases we have considered
so far correspond respectively to a polymer on a fully connected lattice, and a polymer on a
random lattice. A variant of this model can be solved exactly using the method of Derrida
and Spohn [13] for the so-called directed polymer problem on a tree. In this variant one
assumes that at each time step τ the connectivity matrix is completely changed and chosen
anew using the same probabilities as above. Each agent i chooses at random exactly c new
neighbours ℓ(i, t), the wealth evolution equation becomes
Wi(t + τ) =
[
Jτ
c
c∑
ℓ=1
Wℓ(i,t) + (1− Jτ)Wi(t)
]
e−V (i,t) (16)
where V is a gaussian random variable of mean zero and variance 2σ2τ . One can then write
a closed equation for the evolution of the wealth distribution [13]. In this case, the wealth
condensation phenomenon takes place whenever σ2τ +Jτ ln(Jτ/c)+(1−Jτ) ln(1−Jτ) > 0.
For Jτ ≪ 1 the transition occurs for σ2 = σ2c = J(1 + ln(c/Jτ)).
For σ > σc, one finds that µ is given by:
µ ≃ ln
(
c
σ2τ
)
ln(c/Jτ)
(17)
and is less than one, signalling the onset of a phase where wealth is condensed on a finite
number of individuals. This precisely corresponds to the glassy phase in the directed polymer
language. The above formula shows that µ depends only weakly on σ or J , in qualitative
agreement with our numerical result for the continuous time model (see Fig. 3). Note that
in the limit c→∞, σc →∞ and the glassy phase disappears, in agreement with the results
above, obtained directly on the mean-field model. Note also that in the limit τ → 0, where
the reshuffling of the neighbours becomes very fast, wealth diffusion within the population
becomes extremely efficient and, as expected, the transition again disappears. Finally, in
the simple case where Jτ = 1 (each agent trading all of his wealth at each time step), the
critical value is σ2cτ = ln c and the exponent µ in the condensed phase is simply µ = σc/σ,
and µ = σ2/σ2c for µ > 1 (see [13]).
Let us note, en passant, that the model considered by Derrida and Spohn has another
interesting interpretation if the Wi’s describe the wealth of companies. The growth of a
company takes place either from internal growth (leading to a term ηi(t)Wi much as above),
but also from merging with another company. If the merging process between two companies
is completely random and takes place at a rate λ per unit time, then the model is exactly
the same as the one considered in Section 3 of [13] (see in particular their Eq. (3.2)).
Although not very realistic, one could also think that the individuals are located on the
nodes of a d-dimensional hypercubic lattice, trading with their neighbours up to a finite
distance. In this case, one knows that for d > 2 there exists again a phase transition between
a ‘social’ economy where µ > 1 and a rich dominated phase µ < 1. On the other hand,
for d ≤ 2, and for large populations, one is always in the extreme case where µ → 0 at
large times. In the case d = 1, i.e. operators organized along a chain-like structure, one can
actually compute exactly the distribution of wealth by transposing the results of [14]. One
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finds for example that the ratio of the maximum wealth to the typical (e.g. median) wealth
behaves as exp
√
N , where N is the size of the population, instead of N1/µ in the case of a
Pareto distribution with µ > 0. The conclusion of the above results is that the distribution of
wealth tends to be very broadly distributed when exchanges are limited, either in amplitude
(i.e. J too small compared to σ2) or topologically (as in the above chain structure). Favoring
exchanges (in particular with distant neighbours) seems to be an efficient way to reduce
inequalities.
Let us now discuss in a cursory way the extension of this model to the case where the
matrix Jij has a non trivial structure. One can always write:
Jij = Dij exp−Fij
2
Jji = Dij exp+
Fij
2
, (18)
where Dij is a symmetric matrix describing the frequency of trading between i and j. Fij is
a local bias: it describes by how much the amount of trading from i to j exceeds that from
j to i. In the absence of the speculative term ηiWi, Eq. (2) is actually a Master equation
describing the random motion of a particle subject to local forces Fij , where Jij is the hopping
rate between site j and site i. This problem has also been much studied [15]. One can in
general decompose the force Fij into a potential part Ui − Uj and a non potential part. For
a purely potential problem, the stationary solution of Eq. (2) with ηi ≡ 0 is the well known
Bolzmann weight:
Wi,eq =
1
Z
exp(−Ui) Z =
N∑
i=1
exp(−Ui). (19)
The statistics of the Wi therefore reflects that of the potential Ui; in particular, large wealths
correspond to deep potential wells. Pareto tails correspond to the case where the extreme
values of the potential obey the Gumbel distribution, which decays exponentially for large
(negative) potentials [11].
The general case where ηi is non zero and/or Fij contains a non potential part is largely
unknown, and worth investigating. A classification of the cases where the Pareto tails survive
the introduction of a non trivial bias field Fij would be very interesting. Partial results in
the context of population dynamics have been obtained recently in [16]. The case where the
i’s are on the nodes of a d dimensional lattice should be amenable to a renormalisation group
analysis along the lines of [17, 18], with interesting results for d ≤ 2. Work in this direction
is underway [19].
In conclusion, we have discussed a very simple model of economy, where the time evolution
is described by an equation capturing, at the simplest level, exchange between individuals and
random speculative trading in such a way that the fundamental symmetry of the economy
under an arbitrary change of monetary units is obeyed. Although our model is not intended
to be fully realistic, the family of equations given by Eq. (2) is extremely rich, and leads
to interesting generic predictions. We have investigated in details a mean-field limit of this
equation and showed that the distribution of wealth is of the Pareto type. The Pareto
behaviour of the tails of this distribution appears to be robust for more general connectivity
matrices, as a mapping to the directed polymer problem shows. In this context, a transition
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between an economy governed by a few individuals from a situation where the wealth is
more evenly spread out, is found. The important conclusion of the above model is that
the distribution of wealth tends to be very broadly distributed when exchanges are limited.
Favoring exchanges (and, less surprisingly, increasing taxes) seems to be an efficient way to
reduce inequalities.
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